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Sectoral Growth in Tanzania Under 
Liberalisation 
 Source Utz (2007) 
 Average annual growth rate 
Type of 
Economic 
Activity 
1990 – 94 1995 - 99 2000-05 
Agriculture 3.1 3.6 4.8 
Industry 2.0 5.4 9.0 
Services 1.9 3.8 6.1 
 
Components of Industrial Growth 
Source: World Bank (2007) 
 Average annual growth rate 
Type of 
Economic 
Activity 
1990 – 94 1995 - 99 2000-05 
Industry 2.0 5.4 9.0 
Mining and 
quarrying 
11.8 14.8 15.2 
Manufacturing 0.4 4.6 7.3 
Electricity and 
water 
4.0 5.7 4.4 
Construction 2.2 3.5 10.3 
 
 
Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Manufacturing 
Success in Tanzania 
 Neo-liberal – removal of constraints on markets led 
to a return to comparative advantage – role of the 
state is to support markets 
 Developmental state – ability of the state to 
incentivise and discipline industrialists. State 
institutions are centralised to take long term 
decisions and implement mechanisms for 
disciplining rent recipients  
 Political Settlement – combination of institutions 
and distribution of power  
Political Economy of ‘Third World Socialism’ 
 Nature and extent of the revolution or political struggle that 
brought the socialist party to power. 
 The extent to which the dominant class groups were able to 
consolidate their political power within the party state and 
create a centralised authority structure within the state. 
  the extent to which formal institutions were created to give 
political voice to the workers and peasants that they claimed 
to represent, albeit that these institutions were often very 
weak or were subverted. 
  extent to which this commitment to constructing socialism 
actually led to a change in the distribution of economic power 
away from the existing capitalist and emerging capitalist 
classes. 
 
Industrial Policy 1961 - 1967 
Established an industrial sector from a very low base – 
  
 industry grew rapidly with import substitution and 
protection, led by industries.  
 Also there was diversification of the industrial base - 
Tanganyika’s first five textile mills were established 
between 1961 and 1968. 
 Expanding the role of Tanzanian-Asians in industry.  
 
Industrial Policy under Ujamaa 
 Attempt to radically restructure f economic power by 
limiting the expansion of domestic and international 
capital.  
 nationalisation of segments of existing industries  
 creation new industrial parastatals. 
 Basic Industrial Strategy of 1975 – meet the 
demands for manufactured goods through local 
production 
Relations between State and Private 
Manufacturing Under Ujamaa 
 the extent to which nationalisation changed the 
ownership structure of industry was in many ways 
quite limited. 
  half of all industry remained in private hands 
throughout the period 
 many of the new parastatal investments were 
undertaken as joint ventures between the state and 
the private sector  
 In other cases, the previous owners stayed on as 
managers under the new ownership structure. 
Relations between State and Private 
Manufacturing Under Ujamaa 
 Political tensions – some Asian Tanzanian members of 
parliament but also policies often framed in anti-
Tanzanian Asian language. 
 1970s – periods of heightened tension – nationalisation 
of houses. 
 Informal relations between private sector traders and 
parastatal officials also constructed through racketeering 
 The period of constraints on private sector accumulation 
were short and not well enforced – Hartmann argues 
that we see the ‘rise and rise’ of capital. 
 
 
 
 
  
 Public Sector Total Public 
Sector 
Private 
Sector Year Central 
Government 
Non-profit 
Bodies 
Parastatals 
1961 41.7 - 3.7 45.4 54.6 
1965 18.9 8.4 4.3 31.6 68.4 
1970 22.4 7.0 34.5 63.8 36.2 
1975 23.8 7.2 31.0 62.0 38.0 
1980 23.7 0.5 15.2 39.5 60.5 
1985 11.4 0.8 22.8 34.9 65.1 
1989 3.9 0.3 55.1 60.2 39.8 
1990 3.4 0.2 36.9 40.6 59.4 
1995 4.0 12.8 0.5 17.2 82.8 
1996 2.6 18.0 0.5 21.1 78.9 
1997 3.7 15.6 0.5 19.9 80.1 
1998 15.5 3.4 3.5 22.4 77.6 
Source: (World Bank 2002) 
Fixed Capital Formation by the Public and 
Private Sectors 1961 – 1998  
 
Crisis in Industry  
 Many constraints similar to other poor countries 
attempting rapid industrialization in the 1970s (oil crisis, 
shortage of foreign exchange) 
 Capital investment expanded in industry but productivity 
fell dramatically - Very low level of capacity utilization. 
 The expansion of subsidies coupled with falling 
productivity – little scope for control of parastatal 
managers 
 Conflicts between managers and workers – CCM initially 
supported unions but then reversed its policy and 
restricted labour activism.  
 
Industrial Policy Under Liberalisation 
 FDI promotion through fiscal incentives 
 Privatisation 
 Schemes to support the expansion of manufactured 
exports 
 Policy called for indigenous manufacturing to be 
supported 
Expansion of FDI into Manufacturing 
 Credibility of fiscal incentives for investors was 
strongly influenced by Tanzania’s reputation for 
political stability in the eyes of foreign investors.  
 Privatisation also brought in large flows of FDI – 
largely into low value added firms targeting the 
domestic markets and it was these firms that led to a 
return to growth in manufacturing after 1996. 
 Legacies of state building and industrial investments 
from the ujamaa period important in explaining FDI 
expansion. 
 
Expansion of the Private Sector 
 There was a rapid growth in the private manufacturing sector. 
  
 The number of manufacturing firms owned by Africans had also 
expanded to around 44% but this was largely in small and micro 
enterprises.  
 
 Official policy was to support indigenous manufacturing firms. 
 
 By 2002, Tanzanian Asian’s owned around 30% of all 
manufacturing firms but these were overwhelmingly medium to 
large scale industrial activities rather than the micro industries.  
 
 70 large manufacturing firms dominate manufacturing output and 
exports 
 Inclusion of private sector within CCM ruling elite 
 
Changing Relations Between State and Private 
Sector Industrialists 
 Gradual inclusion of business people within the 
formal framework of the ruling party.  
 
 Hostility towards Asian capital was exhibited in the 
public debate about ‘uzawa’ (indigenisation) across 
the period.  
  
 Open support by the state to the accumulation 
strategies of non-indigenous capital was sometimes 
politically difficult – very slow start to EPZ 
programme. 
 
Constraints on Industrial Policy Under 
Liberalisation 
 
 EPZs implemented as ‘stand alone’ programme – 
more difficult to enforce performance standards. 
 
 Corruption in import support schemes. 
 
 Corruption in finance to privatized firms 
Conclusion 
 Pace of industrialisation has been influenced by the 
extent to which the state has supported capitalist 
accumulation strategies in industry. 
 particularistic nature of the relationship between 
domestic capitalists and the CCM led to fragmented 
support to individual industrialists 
 Support to technological learning limited and 
unsuccessful – mainly resource based manufacturing. 
 The ‘success’ story actually represents a return to the 
longer run growth of the  manufacturing sector since 
independence. 
